INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 2006, four men were indicted in connection with a $4.6 million dollar body-snatching scheme. While working for Biomedical Tissue 1 Services Limited, the men allegedly paid funeral homes $1,000 per body from which they mined tissues, organs, and bones without the consent of the deceased's families. They then sold the parts for research, medical education, 2 and transplantation. Once harvested for valuable parts, the corpses were 3 either cremated or stuffed with "PVC plumbing pipe in place of the bones" and sewed back up for a funeral. 4 Although an exceptionally gruesome analogy, the Biomedical Tissue Services scandal somewhat parallels how "elite universities . . . [and] prominent pharmaceutical companies" have abused the rights of living 5 persons with respect to their human biological materials. Such abuse has prompted exploration for a new legal framework to govern human biological materials. One proposed framework would grant people a property interest in their biological materials. 6 "The ramifications of recognizing and enforcing a property interest in body tissues are not known, but are greatly feared . . . ." Historically, both 7 courts and legislatures have resisted acknowledging property rights in the human body and its constituent parts. Since Colonial America, the common 8 law governed the disposition of human corpses. Not until the twentieth century did American courts grant the deceased's next of kin a quasi-property right in the deceased's body. These rights include: "the right to possession 9 and custody of the body for burial, the right to have it remain in its final resting place, and the right to recover damages for any outrage, indignity, or injury to the body." 10 During the mid-twentieth century, as biomedical technology advancements created demand for transplantable tissue, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) was drafted and adopted throughout the United States. The Act authorizes competent adults to gift all or any part of their 11 bodies upon death for medical research, education, or transplantation. 12 However, it fails to address both inter vivos donations and sales of all or any part of the body. 17. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS REPORT, supra note 9, at 76. 18. Boulier, supra note 6, at 695. 19. Prowda, supra note 16, at 629; see also infra Part I.
In 1984, Congress established the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), the current version of which prohibits the sale of "the human 14 (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any other human organ . . . specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation." 15 "The social policy behind this law is 'ethical and humane,' and designed so that scientific research would not be pursued a[t] the physical cost of the economically and socially deprived." However, the law does not apply to 16 human tissue and cell sales for non-transplantation purposes, such as research.
17
As illustrated above, "the law is often slow to come to grips with technology, especially when technology advances so quickly." Currently, 18 research participants lack property rights in their excised biological materials. Accordingly, this Note explores whether any context exists in 19 which research participants should retain limited property rights in such materials. Part I examines the current legal framework governing the rights of research participants, with special attention to informed consent and property laws. Part II then explores important policy considerations implicated in discerning whether research participants should retain limited property rights. Next, Part III recommends that a property law concept, traditionally used in the real property donation context, be used to secure research participants appropriate rights based on significant policy considerations. Finally, Part IV briefly summarizes the points addressed in this Note. [ 
Lack of Informed Consent
The California Supreme Court first determined that Moore had a cause of action for lack of informed consent. Specifically, the court held "a 41 physician who is seeking a patient's consent for a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient's informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment." 
Conversion
The court, however, held that Moore lacked a cause of action for conversion because he did not retain an ownership interest in his excised 43 In his dissent, Justice Mosk illustrated three major flaws in the majority's analysis. First, the issue of whether a patient retains an ownership interest in his excised biological materials was an issue of first impression to the California Supreme Court. Id. at 507 (Mosk, J., dissenting). As such, the absence of other court decisions granting a patient such an interest was irrelevant. Id. Second, property rights are sometimes described as sticks in a bundle of rights-with different sticks comprising different forms of property. Id. at 509. One such stick is the right to transfer. Id. Although California state law heavily regulated the disposition of excised human biological materials, the law granted patients the right to transfer such materials through donation, thereby implying that the patients had a limited property interest in such materials. Id. at 518 n.23. Lastly, the lack of informed consent remedy grants patients merely illusory protection of their biological materials. Id. at 519-20; see infra Part II.B. biological materials. The court gave three reasons for its holding. First, no 43 court to date had granted a patient an ownership interest in such materials. 44 Second, California state law heavily regulated the disposition of human biological materials, drastically limiting a patient's interest in them. Lastly, 45 because the patented cell line was "both factually and legally distinct" from Moore's biological materials, he lacked a property interest in the cell line and its derivative products. 46 Next, the court declined to extend conversion law to cover the use of human biological materials in medical research for three reasons. First, a 47 balancing of the prevailing policy considerations counseled against extension. Second, the legislature was the better forum to decide whether 48 to extend conversion liability. And lastly, the court lacked a pressing need 49 to extend conversion law because of the lack of an informed consent remedy. Id. The court's analysis contained certain weaknesses. First, although the court feared medical research would be chilled by requiring researchers to disclose economic interests, it ignored that Dr. Matalon and the hospital had already chilled medical research when they patented Dr. Matalon's research, thereby removing it from the public domain. Also, the court completely disregarded the American Medical Association's Code of Ethics, Professional Guidelines for Physician-Researchers, which required physician-researchers to disclose potential commercial applications to research volunteers and obtain their informed consent before realizing a profit on products developed from their biological materials. Id. at 1071 n.2 (citing Am. Med. Ass'n Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Op. on Soc. Policy Issues E.208 (1990)).
67. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. 68. Id. However, the parents and non-profit organizations did have certain expectations of return from their donation, such as public access to Dr. Matalon's research, affordable testing, more effective prevention techniques, and possibly a cure to Canavan disease. Id. at 1066-67.
Lack of Informed Consent
The district court held that the parents and non-profit organizations failed to state a cause of action for lack of informed consent. While the court 61 acknowledged that a medical researcher owes research volunteers a limited duty of informed consent, it refused to require a researcher to disclose economic interests for four reasons. First, such a requirement would give donors complete dominion over the purposes and beneficiaries of medical research. Second, such a requirement would be unworkable. Third, it 62 63 would cause researchers to constantly evaluate whether a discloseable event occurred, thereby chilling medical research. Lastly, as the parents 64 voluntarily donated their children's biological materials to medical research, they are not similarly situated to a patient whose biological materials are obtained for medical research on account of diagnosis and treatment. As 65 such, the court determined that they should receive different treatment. 
Conversion
The district court next determined that the parents and non-profit organizations lacked a cause of action for conversion. Specifically, the 67 plaintiffs did not retain an ownership interest in the children's excised biological materials because the materials were voluntarily donated without a contemporaneous expectation of return. In addition, the court found that intention of the donor to make a gift; (2) delivery of property by donor to donee; and (3) acceptance by donee whose ownership takes effect immediately and absolutely." 85 In concluding that the research participants had the present intention to make a gift, the court relied upon the informed consent forms that repeatedly asserted WU's ownership of the donated materials and did not advise the research participants that they entrusted their materials to Dr. Catalona. 86 Nevertheless, Dr. Catalona and the research participants argued that the research participants' right to withdraw from a research protocol included the right to control "the use and location of their excised biological materials." 87 However, the court held that the right to withdraw only meant that the research participants had chosen to cease providing biological materials pursuant to a research protocol. The court based its holding upon two 88 separate grounds. First, governing federal regulations did not provide the right asserted by Dr. Catalona and the research participants. Second, WU 89 policy clearly indicated that once research participants discontinued their 90. Id. at 999. Of note, Dr. Catalona and the research participants also argued that the research participants made a bailment of their biological materials to WU, designating WU as the bailee. Id. at 1001. However, the court rejected this argument, as it was inconsistent with the court's previous ruling that the research participants had made an inter vivos gift of the materials to WU. Id. Also significant were the facts that the research participants failed to inform WU that they wanted their materials returned when they "delivered" them to WU, federal and state regulations prohibited possession of such materials by the research participants, and the medical research community did not consider the relationship between a medical research institution and research participants to be a bailment. Id participation in a research protocol, WU handled the participants' biological materials in one of three ways: destroying the materials, storing them indefinitely without further use, or removing all identifying markers and using the materials in exempt "anonymized" research. 90 Next, the court discussed certain policy implications concerning the argument of Dr. Catalona and the research participants. First, the court feared that granting the research participants ownership rights in the use and location of their biological materials would create a market for the materials such that the materials would become chattels selling for the highest price. Moreover, 91 granting such rights would thwart medical research as such materials would be distributed to the highest bidder rather than the most important research protocol. Also, "[t]he integrity and utility of all biorepositories would be 92 seriously threatened" because "individual samples would come and go" such that research protocols could no longer rely upon aggregate collections. 
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Several important policies must be considered in determining whether research participants who donate biological materials for medical research should retain limited property rights in such materials. In making this determination, the interests of the research participants must be balanced against society's interest in the free progression of medical research. 96 Nevertheless, "considerations related to the well-being of the [research participants] should take precedence over the interests of science and society." Research participants have three primary interests in favor of 97 property rights in their biological material: (1) dignity, (2) autonomy, and (3) economic profitability. Each interest implicates important concerns for which any ownership regime must adequately account.
A. Research Participants' Interest in Dignity
A research participant's interest in dignity is comprised of three important notions. First, an unequal amount of information exists between research participants and physician-researchers.
Specifically because of special considerations associated with it and its constituent parts. 105 Specifically, as one commentator explained:
[Property law] treat[s] goods considered "property" primarily as market goods. . . .
[M]arket goods are optimally distributed through the auspices of the market which takes into account all the values and disvalues pertaining to a good and allocates the good in such a manner as to maximize overall value. The human body and its component parts are not, however, market goods. This is so because many modes of valuing the body cannot be translated into or understood in terms of a market price. 106 Nevertheless, consistent with the progression of technology, society has allowed "the body to be used in various ways that would have once been unacceptable under an older conception of the body."
For example, 107 commercial interests in the human body are rapidly growing. In the wake 108 of such societal changes, limited ownership rights in human biological materials may protect the dignity of the human body because such rights would grant research participants an "enforceable stake" in their biological materials, allowing them to control such materials even upon removal.
109
The final notion included in a research participant's dignity interest is altruism. Among other motivations, research participants donate their biological materials as a public charity.
To effectuate the participants' 110 donative intent, research institutions and physician-researchers must be limited to prevent them from exploiting research-participant altruism. Such boundaries may be set by allowing research participants a limited ownership right in their biological materials.
B. Research Participants' Interest in Autonomy
A research participant also has a significant interest in autonomy. Both judicial decisions and legislation establish that individuals have the right to make decisions regarding their bodies. In the context of human biological materials, however, informed consent laws are the most relevant. Unfortunately, such laws do not adequately protect research participants' autonomy interests. Specifically, in Moore, Justice Mosk explained how informed-consent laws grant research participants only illusory protection of their biological materials. Specifically, patients claiming a lack of informed consent must 112 prove that: (1) had they been informed of the undisclosed information they would not have consented to the procedure in question; and, (2) in the same situation a reasonably prudent person would not have consented either. 113 However, in cases like Moore, the potential treatment benefit-a life-saving operation-generally outweighs the undisclosed risk of the physician using the biological materials for research or commercial product development. 114 Therefore, a trier of fact will most likely conclude that a reasonably prudent person would have consented to the procedure in question. 115 Moreover, Greenberg determined that a physician-researcher owes no continuing duty of informed consent to research volunteers who lack a "clinical relationship" with the physician-researcher.
Thus, a physician-116 researcher need not "disclose any information that might influence [the research participants'] decision to participate or decline to participate" in the research.
117
In both situations informed consent laws did not protect research participants' autonomy interest. Instead, the participants were stripped of their right to make decisions regarding their own bodies. In light of these offensive outcomes, if research participants are not granted limited property rights in their biological materials, they may refuse to donate such materials, thereby chilling medical research.
Without 
C. Research Participants' Economic Interest
Lastly, research participants have an economic interest in their biological materials. As previously mentioned, research participants provide the raw materials of medical research without compensation. In return for their contribution, they typically expect broad access to affordable products such as medication, therapy, and testing.
However, such expectations are 120 generally not realized. Granting research participants limited property rights in their biological materials may promote a redistribution of wealth among research participants, physician-researchers, research institutions, and biotechnology companies. Currently, the number of patents in the biotechnology industry is everincreasing and "secrecy is fast becoming the norm." Additionally, patents 121 and secrecy also serve to increase end-user health care costs. Granting research participants limited property rights would allow them greater control over the distribution of their biological materials and permit them to choose physician-researchers less likely to commercialize the fruits of their medical research. 
III

A. The Fee Simple Defeasible
To accomplish this objective, the legislature could grant research participants the right to create a fee simple defeasible in their excised biological materials and mandate health care providers to inform participants of this right as part of informed consent. Currently, fee simple defeasibles are used in conjunction with real property donations. A fee simple defeasible "fee simple determinable" and the "fee simple subject to a condition subsequent." However, the fee simple determinable is more amenable to the 141 context of human biological materials.
A fee simple determinable ownership interest is extremely limited.
142
Specifically, the interest automatically expires when a stated event transpires. Also, to create such an interest the donor must use specific 143 language indicating the durational aspect of the interest; language merely stating the donor's motive for making the gift is not enough.
144
Through a fee simple determinable, research participants could donate their biological materials to a research institution so long as a certain physician-researcher receives them. This protects research participants' interests in privacy and autonomy. For example, if a research participant's trusted physician removes a cancerous tumor from the participant, the participant could designate the tumor to be used only in that particular physician's research. In addition, this approach encourages the free exchange of information. For example, a research participant could specifically designate a physician-researcher that the participant believes will leave any information discovered in the public domain. Additionally, once the physician-researcher receives such materials, the research participant could no longer control its use or transfer. This ensures the unhindered progression of medical research by limiting the control research participants have over their biological materials.
B. Creation of the Fee Simple Determinable
Although property law is derived from the common law, "the [l]egislature . . . is [clearly] the proper deliberative forum" to grant research participants the power to create a fee simple defeasible in their biological materials.
145
Current state and federal laws view such materials as sui generis, "regulating their disposition to achieve policy goals rather than abandoning them to the general law of personal property." Accordingly, the legislature has the 146 proper resources to determine whether to extend the fee simple defeasible to human biological materials. More specifically, because this issue requires a uniform solution, Congress is the appropriate legislature to grant research participants such rights. Although the states generally regulate both property law and the disposal of human biological materials, Congress has enacted comprehensive legislation regarding such materials, thereby demonstrating its competency in the area. Unfortunately, Congress also has demonstrated susceptibility to 147 powerful interest groups. For example, former Vice President Al Gore described the Medicare prescription drug benefit as "a token plan designed to trick the voters and satisfy pharmaceutical companies." Specifically, 148 Congress restricted the federal government from negotiating Medicare drug prices even though the government already negotiates drug prices for both Medicaid and the Veteran's Administration. This created higher drug costs 149 for Medicare beneficiaries and greater profits for pharmaceutical companies. 150 With respect to human biological materials, both biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies are entrepreneurial profit-seeking entities. Because they use such materials in extremely expensive, high risk research projects, they traditionally desire unconditional title to the materials. As a result, they will most likely oppose granting research participants the right to create a fee simple defeasible and its associated conditions in such materials. Consequently, they may exert political pressure on Congress to impede the passage of legislation expanding the rights of research participants in their biological materials.
C. Enforcement of the Fee Simple Determinable
A fee simple determinable ownership interest is accompanied by a future interest-either a possibility of reverter or an executory interest. While a 151 possibility of reverter is retained by the donor, an executory interest is created in another donee. In addition, if the fee simple determinable interest holder 152 violates its stated condition, the interest passes to the future interest holder by operation of law.
153
As state laws prohibit persons from possessing their excised biological materials, a possibility of reverter could not be used in conjunction with such materials.
However, an executory interest could designate a contingent 154 physician-researcher recipient should the primary recipient fail to receive the donated biological materials. In addition, if the research institution does not distribute the materials in accordance with the fee simple determinable condition, the research participant could have an equitable cause of action for injunctive relief ordering that the materials either be placed with the designated physician-researcher or destroyed. A downside to judicial intervention, however, is that the process is both slow and can be very costly.
155. Boulier, supra note 6, at 695 (citing SIR ZELMAN COWEN, REFLECTIONS ON MEDICINE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 5 (1986)).
This may have a detrimental effect on donated material with a limited useful life.
IV. CONCLUSION
A commentator once noted that although "the law marches with medicine," it does so "in the rear and limping a little." Indeed, as new uses 155 for the human body and its component parts have evolved, so too has the body's value appreciated. Laws governing the body's disposition, however, have not kept pace with this trend. In particular, laws dictating research participants' rights with respect to their biological materials have failed to adequately protect important participant interests, including dignity, autonomy, and economic concerns.
As illustrated through Moore, Greenberg, and Catalona, research participants do not retain an ownership interest in their excised biological materials. However, research participants may nevertheless be able to donate such materials pursuant to the laws of certain states. Unfortunately, under the current legal framework, participants' altruistic donations are likely to be abused. For example, physician-researchers may fail to disclose either the value of a participant's biological materials or patent information to create higher end-user product costs. Undoubtedly, research participants need greater control over their biological materials to prevent such abuse-control which should properly flow from Congress.
Specifically, research participants who donate biological materials for medical research should retain limited rights to exclude and transfer with respect to their materials. This can be achieved by granting participants the right to create a fee simple determinable in such materials. A fee simple determinable will appropriately balance significant policy considerations to ensure the free progression of medical research is consonant with the protection of important research-participant interests. The current absence of donor rights demands that action be taken to prevent future abuse.
